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INTRODUCTION 
Postal ratemaking seems an unlikely issue to engage all three branches 
of government in an epic struggle over White House control of inde-
pendent agencies, the judicial role in the administrative state, and the 
President's authority to sidestep congressional controls through recess ap-
pointments. Think again. In the final days of the Bush Administration, a 
seemingly innocuous dispute over the use of bar codes in first class mailings 
was transformed into a glorious and gory battle over the scope of White 
House, congressional, judicial, and independent agency authority. 
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks to Jon 
Sheldon and Wendy Watson for research assistance. Thanks also to Rick Cooper, Dan Foucheaux, 
Dan Kahan, Eric Koetting, Nelson Lund, and David Rubin. This article is dedicated to the many 
fine individuals I had the pleasure of working with as a consultant to the U.S. Postal Service. 
The title of this Article derives from a Washington Post editorial. See Tempest in an Envelope, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at A20. 
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The focal point of this dispute was the President's threat to fire any 
member of the Postal Service's Board of Governors who was unwilling to 
withdraw the Postal Service from ongoing litigation with the U.S. Postal 
Rate Commission. Rooted in the belief that the President is constitutional-
ly empowered to direct the operations of all government entities, this presi-
dential broadside failed miserably. Newspaper columnists and editorial writ-
ers savaged the President. 1 More significantly, federal district court Judge 
John Oberdorfer enjoined the President from removing the Governors, and 
a unanimous D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals validated Postal Service au-
thority to appear in court without Justice Department approvaU 
The Postal Service episode is generally understood as a last gasp effort 
by proponents of the "unitary executive" to flex their political muscle by 
treating independent agency heads as if they were at-will employees of the 
executive. President Bush's Postal Service gambit can be depicted as a bat-
tle between proponents of unitariness and independence. The Bush Ad-
ministration, however, did not seek out this controversy; the triggering 
event was a Postal Rate Commission campaign to neutralize Postal Service 
authority. 
The Postal Service episode is also instructive in sorting out some less 
obvious but equally important lessons in the unitariness-independence de-
bate. A root cause of the Postal Service fiasco is the failure of the legisla-
tive branch to think through its parcelling out of governmental authority. 
When Congress removed the Postmaster General from the President's Cab-
inet in 1970, Congress paid insufficient attention to structure-of-govern-
ment concerns. Despite a statutory scheme that envisions the airing of 
most Postal Service-Rate Commission disputes in federal court, Congress 
never considered the independent litigation authority issue. The courts' 
role in this matter also merits attention. Judge Oberdorfer's principal con-
cern when enjoining the President seemed to be the judiciary's proprietary 
interest in resolving the independent litigation authority dispute. 
This Commentary proceeds in three parts. Part 1 introduces the 
bizarre world of postal ratemaking by describing the Postal Service-Postal 
Rate Commission dispute. The actions and motivations of the Postal Ser-
vice, Postal Rate Commission, and Bush Administration are considered. 
Part II examines the underlying causes of this dispute, focusing on Con-
gress' failure in 1970 to give a nanosecond of thought to critical provisions 
1. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Two Cents Plain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A17; Tempest 
in an Envelope, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at A20. 
2. Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Mackie 
v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1993). 
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of its ratemaking statute. Finally, in Part Ill, I argue that the structure of 
postal ratemaking needs reform and that, in general, Congress must pay at-
tention to structural concerns to reduce conflicts between the executive 
and other government entities free of White House control. Specifically, 
the Postal Rate Commission should be housed in the Postal Service, leav-
ing the Postal Service as the principal policymaker and litigator in ratemak-
ing matters. 
Before turning to Part 1, it is worth mention that I witnessed and 
participated in this struggle. Throughout much of this dispute, I served as a 
consultant to the U.S. Postal Service. With that said, my Commentary 
questions some of the arguments advanced by the Postal Service and, more 
importantly, shifts the focus of analysis away from the White House-Postal 
Service battle to the Congress. 
l. THE SAGA OF U.S. POSTAL SERVICE V. POSTAL RATE COMMISSION 
A. The Current Postal Ratemaking Structure 
Postal ratemaking is a unique enterprise within the administrative 
state. Rather than having one government entity set postal rates and de-
fend those rates against private party court challenges, postal ratemaking is 
the product of a byzantine relationship between two independent agencies 
that sometimes allows for private party court challenges. Let me explain. 
Postal rate proposals originate with the U.S. Postal Service's Board of Gov-
ernors, a nine member body whose members are appointed by the Presi-
dent, serve staggered terms, and can only be removed for cause.3 The 
Board of Governors submits proposals to the Postal Rate Commission, a 
five member body whose members are similarly appointed by the President 
and can only be removed for cause.4 The Commission holds hearings on 
the proposed rate, considers evidence and testimony from the Postal Ser-
vice and private mailers, and accepts, rejects, or modifies the proposai.S 
[So far, so good.] 
The Commission recommendation returns to the Postal Service Gov-
ernors. Unlike an administrative law judge finding, however, the Gover-
nors may not modify the recommendation by a simple majority vote. Only 
a unanimous vote can accomplish that task. At the same time, the Gover-
nors are not limited to accepting or rejecting the Commission recommenda-
3. 39 u.s.c. § 202 (1988). 
4. 39 u.s.c. § 3601 (1988). 
5. 39 u.s.c. § 3622 (1988). 
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tion. [Here is where things get complex.] The Governors may accept the 
Commission recommendation under protest and let a federal appeals court 
settle Service-Commission differences. 6 This procedure may take two 
forms. In one instance, the Governors may elect to let the rate take effect 
and allow disappointed private mailers to sue them as respondents. Alter-
natively, the Governors may directly sue the Commission over the disputed 
rate. Thus, the Postal Service chooses whether it will be petitioner or 
respondent. 
A remarkable feature of this system is that Commission ratemaking 
may spur concurrent multiple lawsuits, some where the Service supports the 
ratemaking decision and others where the Service opposes the decision, 
sometimes as petitioner and other times as respondent. This is precisely 
what occurred in the bar code dispute. On January 4, 1991, the Commis-
sion responded to a Postal Service ratemaking request with a two-volume 
opinion addressing bar-code discounts, other proposed changes, and un-
requested rate and classification changes.7 On January 22, the Service's 
Governors elected to sue the Commission directly on bar code discounts, 
but left it to private mailers to sue the Service on the unrequested change 
methodology toward certain city mail carrier costs. 8 
The Governors' decision to sue and be sued, while unusual, is permit-
ted by the statutory framework. Moreover, disputes between the Postal Ser-
vice and Postal Rate Commission lie at the heart of this intricate statutory 
scheme and certainly are to be expected. What then distinguishes the dis-
pute over bar codes, culminating in threats of presidential removal, from 
other Service-Commission squabbles? Well ... nothing. The bar code dis-
pute was structurally indistinguishable from prior conflicts except that the 
Justice Department and the White House Counsel's Office voiced strong 
institutional objections to the ratemaking structure itself. The Bush Ad-
ministration argued that neither the Governors nor Commissioners had in-
dependent litigating authority to present their views in court without Jus-
tice Department authorization.9 The decision to defend or attack Commis-
sion recommendations was to be made by the Justice Department alone. 
Unlike other administrations which either authorized separate Service and 
6. 39 u.s.c. § 3625 (1988). 
7. Op. and Recommended Decision Postal Rate Comm'n (1991). 
8. See Decision of the Governors of the United States Postal Service on the Recommend-
ed Decision of the Postal Rate Commission on Postal Rate and Fee Changes (Docket No. R90-1, 
Jan. 22, 1991). The Governors and the private mailers' petitions for review were all filed in the 
D.C. Circuit. 
9. See Letter from C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President, to Postal Service Governors 
Oan. 6, 1993). 
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Commission representation or otherwise ensured that the positions of both 
sides were represented, the Bush Administration sought to exercise unilater-
al control over ratemaking. The Bush Administration also attacked the 
ratemaking regime on Article III grounds, claiming that it was inappropri-
ate for federal judges to resolve a purely intramural dispute between two 
government agencies. 10 
Bush Administration attitudes towards independent litigating authority 
within the intragovernmental litigation context introduced a new dimen-
sion in Service-Commission litigation. With that said, neither the Gover-
nors, the Commissioners, nor the Bush White House could have imagined 
the several unexpected turns taken by this controversy. 
B. The Competing Interests of the Commission, Postal Service, and 
Justice Department 
To understand the ratemaking dispute, one must understand the long-
standing Commission dissatisfaction with Postal Service attorneys defend-
ing Commission ratemaking. Remember, if the Postal Service accepts 
Commission ratemaking under protest, and private mailers file challenges, 
the challenges are filed against a Postal Service that disagrees with Com· 
mission ratemaking. 11 In other words, not only does the Postal Service 
choose whether it is petitioner or respondent in ratemaking challenges, it 
also determines whether the Commission is a party to ratemaking disputes. 
To avoid this Postal Service dominance, the Commission lobbied both 
Congress and the Justice Department. First, the Commission, without 
success, supported legislation making it a party to private mailer challenges 
to postal ratemaking. 12 Second, the Commission and some of its congres-
sional overseers asked the Justice Department to defend private mailer 
challenges and block the Postal Service from using its own attorneys. 13 
10. See Letter from Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, to Mary 
S. Ekano, General Counsel, U.S. Postal Service (Oct. 27, 1992). 
11. The Service's ability to subordinate Commission factfinding distinguishes the Service-
Commission arrangement from other split enforcement schemes. For example, the Secretary of 
Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission often settle their disputes by 
suing each other in federal court. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 
111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991). 
12. See Letter from Senators David Pryor and Ted Stevens to William P. Barr, Attorney 
General (Feb. 21, 1992). 
13. See id.; Letter from George W. Haley, Chairman, Postal Rate Commission, to Stuart M. 
Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division (Feb. 26, 1991); Letter from George W. 
Haley to Stuart M. Gerson (Feb. 13, 1992); Letter from George W. Haley to Stuart M. Gerson 
(Sept. 22, 1992). 
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Noting that "[t]here is a significant risk that the Postal Service may not 
effectively defend the Commission's Opinion," 14 the Commission argued 
that "only Department of Justice attorneys willing and able to use advice 
and assistance from both postal agencies would be able to present a bal-
anced government position."15 The Commission, moreover, claimed the 
Justice Department was authorized to run herd over the Service because of 
statutory language requiring Attorney General consent to Postal Service 
self-representation. 
The Justice Department was receptive to this argument. Traditionally, 
the Justice Department-pointing to statutory language recognizing Attor-
ney General control "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized" 16-is a fierce de-
fender of its authority to control government litigation. Although Con-
gress has granted independent litigating authority to roughly thirty-five 
governmental entities, 17 the Justice Department views any intrusion on its 
turf as a great affront. Justice's Office for Legal Counsel (OLC), for exam-
ple, advised the Attorney General in 1989 that the authorization of private 
citizens to prosecute civil fraud claims "may well be the most important 
separation of powers question you will have to address. "18 In past years, 
Justice ducked this representation issue in the ratemaking context by either 
representing Postal Service interests while taking note of divergent Rate 
Commission positions or authorizing Postal Service self-representation while 
allowing the Commission to present its views as an amicus curiae. 19 No 
longer satisfied with this mealy-mouthed approach, the Justice Department 
decided to follow the Rate Commission's suggestion and assert control over 
private mailer litigation. 
The Commission, however, got more than it bargained for. Keep in 
mind that the Commission's beef ~ith the Service was limited to private 
mailer challenges where it was not a party to the litigation. When the 
Commission was a party to litigation (when sued directly by the Service), it 
thought that it and the Postal Service were authorized to present their 
competing views before the courts of appeal. The Bush Justice Department, 
and especially the White House Counsel, had a much different take on 
14. Letter from George W. Haley to Stuart M. Gerson (Sept. 22, 1992), supra note 13. 
15. Letter from George W. Haley to Stuart M. Gerson (Feb. 13, 1992), supra note 13. 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988). See generally The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator 
for the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47 (1982); Susan M. Olsen, Challenges to the 
Gatekeeper: The Debate over Federal Litigating Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 71 (1984). 
17. See Olson, supra note 16, at 73 n.12. 
18. 13 Op. Off. Legal Counse\249 (1989). 
19. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MULTI-MEMBER 
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 18 (May 1992). 
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things. Unitary theorists within the administration advocated using Jus-
tice's Office for Legal Counsel, instead of Article lli judges, to resolve 
disputes between the Postal Service and the Commission. Specifically, 
OLC should resolve ratemaking disputes and either remand the matter back 
to the Commission (if it agreed with the Service) or have Justice Depart· 
ment attorneys defend-in the Service's name...,..-the proposed rate (if it 
agreed with the Commission). 20 
The Postal Service did not appreciate this Commission-initiated Jus-
tice Department challenge to its litigating authority and to its institutional 
independence in ratemaking. Perceiving that independent litigating au-
thority is relatively widespread, essential to independent agency policymak-
ing, and no longer subject to even the slightest constitutional doubt, the 
Postal Service condemned the OLC "unitary executive" model as antithet· 
ical to the most basic tenets of the modern administrative state: the right of 
independent agency heads to make policy decisions free of executive coer· 
cion and the legitimacy of intra-governmental litigation. Rather than 
frame its attack in high sounding constitutional rhetoric, however, the Pos· 
tal Service hinged its argument on the ratemaking statute. Noting that 
Congress' choice of the D.C. Circuit as the preferred forum for the resolu-
tion of Service-Commission disputes assumes independent litigating author· 
ity, the Service also interpreted otherwise ambiguous statutory language to 
support its right to self-representation. First pointing to statutory language 
requiring the Justice Department to "furnish the Postal Service such legal 
representation as it may require" and to statutory language requiring Justice 
Department services to be "deem[ed] appropriate" by the Service, the Ser· 
vice characterized the Attorney General consent requirement as a limited 
opportunity for the Department to represent the Postal Service in a manner 
the Service deemed appropriate. 21 Second, the Service broadly inter-
preted a statutory specification that judicial review of postal ratemaking be 
made "in accordance" with the Hobbs Act-a legislative garbage dump 
which, among other things, specifies that agencies may defend their final 
orders in their own name. 22 
lt came as no surprise that the Postal Service, Justice Department, and 
Commission proffered competing interpretations of the ratemaking statute. 
Each entity simply advanced the interpretation that maximized its litigation 
20. See Intra-Executive Branch Resolution of Dispute Between Postal Service and Postal 
Rate Commission (fax transmitted from White House to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon) 
(Dec. 9, 1992). 
21. 39 u.s.c. §§ 409(d), 411 (1988). 
22. 39 u.s.c. § 3628 (1988); 28 u.s.c. § 2348 (1988). 
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authority. The Postal Service and Rate Commission each sought to pre-
serve its independent voice before the courts. When the Service and Com-
mission were opposing parties, each agency supported self-representation. 
In private mailer disputes, however, the Commission was not a party. 
Consequently, while the Service preferred self-representation, the Commis-
sion (which could not speak its own voice) sought to replace a hostile Ser-
vice with a potentially hospitable Justice Department. The Justice Depart· 
ment, in contrast, disapproved of either the Postal Service or the Commis-
sion having an independent voice. Rather, Justice endorsed an "intra· 
executive" dispute resolution model that would transform all Service-Com-
mission disputes into private mailer challenges against a Postal Service 
solely represented by the Justice Department. 
C. The Battle Over the Ratemaking Authority 
Justice, Postal Service, and Commission efforts to maxtmtze their 
litigation authority are to be expected. What was unexpected was the 
lengths to which the Postal Service, the White House, and the Justice 
Department would go in standing their ground. Lines were drawn in the 
sand and a holy war was launched. 
1. Commission Efforts to Block Postal Service Self-Representation 
The opening volley in the battle over Postal Service self-representation 
occurred on January 23, 1991, one day after the Governors' decision on the 
Commission's bar code ratemaking proposal. 23 The Service notified the 
Justice Department of its decision to sue the Commission and sought con-
sent for self-representation. For fifteen years the Attorney General had 
consented to such requests, leaving the knotty issue of the Service's inde-
pendent litigating authority lurking in the shadows. But things were differ-
ent this time. Having witnessed the Service raise concerns not raised by 
other petitioners in its purported defense of an earlier Commission pro-
posal,24 the Rate Commission was no longer willing to quietly accede to 
Service control of private· mailer disputes. In February 1991, the Commis-
23. See Letter from Harold J. Hughes, General Counsel, U.S. Postal Service, to Stuart M. 
Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division Oan. 23, 1991). 
24. See Newsweek, 1nc. v. United States Postal Serv., 663 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd 
sub nom. National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810 
(1983). 
HeinOnline -- 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1043 1993-1994
Tempest in an Envelope 1043 
sian formally petitioned the Justice Department to deny the Service self-
representation. 25 
The Commission petition was well-timed. Combusting with the Com-
mission's request was the Department's traditional reluctance to consent to 
agency self-representation and Bush Administration efforts to develop a 
legal strategy for protecting presidential authority. Bush, more than any 
other president, embraced the "unitary executive" theory of White House 
control over government operations.26 
Under the "unitary executive" model, intragovernmental disputes are 
decided within the executive branch instead of before the courts. When 
the Postal Service represented the government in private mailer disputes, 
those concerns could be winked at because the White House could claim 
that the Postal Service was part of the executive and subject to presidential 
direction. In other words, even though Postal Service and not Justice 
Department attorneys represented the government, the White House could 
claim that Service attorneys were putting into place the executive's view of 
appropriate postal ratemaking. When the Service sued the Rate Commis-
sion, however, the fiction of presidential control evaporated. The Bush 
White House, through its counsel's office, therefore felt that the Service-
Commission flap over bar codes had to be resolved within the Justice De-
partment and not by the D.C. Circuit. 
The Justice Department, however, did not want to engage in open 
warfare with the Postal Service. Because the "unitary executive" theory 
calls for resolution of all intragovernmental disputes within the executive 
branch, a postal Service and Justice Department fight in court over the self-
representation issue would be to concede the authority of the Postal Service 
to take positions at odds with the White House (on the representation issue 
at least). The Bush Administration, therefore, sought to make the Postal 
Service dispute disappear without judicial involvement. 
The Administration's strategy, at first, seemed to be one of delay, 
threats, and prayers. From late January, 1991 to September 25, 1992, the 
Justice Department never formally responded to the Service's request for 
self-representation. Instead, the Department sought to stare down the Ser-
vice by threatening to deny its request. During this period, however, the 
25. Letter from George W. Haley to Stuart M. Gerson (Feb. 26, 1991), supra note 13. 
26. See generally Nelson Lund, Guardians to the Presidency: The Office of Counsel to the Presi-
dent and the Office of Legal Counsel (forthcoming 1994). For example, Ronald Reagan-a supposed 
believer in the unitary executive-never vetoed a bill because it intruded on the powers of his 
office. ln contrast, each of the eleven bills that George Bush vetoed on constitutional grounds 
would have limited the President's constitutional authority. See id. 
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Service filed numerous pleadings in both the private mailer and Commis· 
sion disputes, including the filing of its bar code dispute against the Com-
mission. Finally, on September 25, 1992, twenty months after the Service 
made its initial request, Justice denied the Service self-representation in the 
private mailer disputeY One month later, on October 27, Justice direct-
ed the Service to withdraw from its dispute with the Commission. 28 
2. The Battle Moves to the D.C. Circuit 
The Postal Service did not follow the Justice Department's directive; 
on November 6, 1992, the Service filed a self-representation motion with 
the D.C. Circuit. 29 Three days later it filed a respondent's brief in the 
private mailer case. (Justice also filed its own brief on behalf of the Postal 
Service in the private mailer case on the same day.)30 lt is perfectly un-
derstandable that the Service did not succumb to Justice's cajoling. Postal 
Service influence on ratemaking is very dependent on control over its 
litigation position and its decision to either sue the Commission or be sued 
by private mailers. If this control disappeared, the ratemaking decision 
would rest with a Commission unchecked by Postal Service litigation au-
thority; moreover, judicial resolution would not be informed by Postal 
Service advocacy. Justice was asking the Service's General Counsel to 
neuter the office of its most important power. Facing such dire conse-
quences, the Postal Service could only improve its institutional position by 
going into court and fighting for its litigation authority. 
The structure of Postal Service decisionmaking also explains the Ser-
vice's refusal to comply with the Justice directive. Day-to-day Postal Ser-
vice decisionmaking, including litigation strategy, is devoid of meaningful 
presidential influence. The Service's presidentially appointed Board of 
Governors only serve in a part-time capacity (typically two days a month) 
and generally leave the running of postal operations to the Postmaster 
General. The Postmaster General and his deputy are appointed by the 
27. Sec Letter from Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, to Mary 
S. Elcano, General Counsel, U.S. Postal Service (Sept. 25, 1992). 
28. See Letter from Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, to Mary 
S. Elcano, General Counsel, U.S. Postal Service (Oct. 27, 1992). 
29. Motion of the United States Postal Service for Leave to Appear as a Party on its Own 
Behalf, Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-
1073). Before the Service filed this motion, it submitted a draft brief to Justice in the hopes that 
Justice would present the Service's views to the court. 
30. Brief of the United States Postal Service as Respondent, Mail Order Ass'n (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (No. 91-1073). 
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Governors, serve at the pleasure of the Governors, and vote as Board mem-
bers on all non-ratemaking issues.31 Under this arrangement, Postal Ser-
vice-Justice Department disputes are managed by professionals with no 
formal ties to the White House. The broad interpretation of their statutory 
authority and resistance to executive branch encroachments by these pro-
fessionals should come as no surprise. 
3. Bush Administration Attempts to Remove Postal Service Governors 
After denying the Service's request for self-representation in its dispute 
with the Commission, the Bush Administration next targeted the Service's 
Board of Governors. By this time, however, George Bush had already been 
defeated in the 1992 election. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit ordered the 
Justice Department to resolve its differences with the Postal Service or file a 
response to the self-representation motionY With so little time to act 
and no long term political capital to lose, the White House opted for 
strongarm tactics. On December 11, 1992, President Bush sent a mem-
orandum to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon (with copies to all nine 
presidentially appointed Governors) "direct[ing]" the Postal Service to 
withdraw from its ongoing judicial dispute with the Rate CommissionY 
This presidential "directive" was undertaken "pursuant to the President's 
authority as Chief Executive and his obligation to take care that the laws 
are faithfully executed. "34 On the same day, the Justice Department filed 
a letter with the D.C. Circuit declaring that "the controversy has been 
resolved" and that the unauthorized filings of the Postal Service "will be 
withdrawn. "35 Three weeks later, on the very day that the Board of Gov-
ernors were set to vote on whether to comply with the directive, the Presi-
dent sent a letter to each Governor informing them that, to ensure compli-
ance with the directive, he "will if necessary exercise [his] authority to 
remove Governors of the Postal Service. "36 
These White House and Justice Department maneuverings were truly 
extraordinary. The President's assertion that he could "direct" Postal Ser-
31. 39 U.S.C. § 202(c), (d) (1988). 
32. Mail Order Ass'n, No. 91-1073 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 1992) (Order). 
33. Memorandum of President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon (Dec. 
11' 1992). 
34. Id. 
35. Letter from Jacob M. Lewis, Civil Division Attorney, to Ron Garvin, Clerk, U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Dec. 11, 1992). 
36. Letter from President George Bush to Bert Mackie, Governor, U.S. Postal Service Qan. 
4, 1993). 
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vice decisionmaking was squarely grounded in the theory of his authority as 
"Chief Executive" over a un~tary government. The nine presidentially 
appointed Governors, along with the Postmaster and Deputy Postmaster 
General, however, stood up to this presidential onslaught, and by a six to 
five vote the Board refused to withdraw its self-representation motion.37 
The noncomplying Board members subsequently obtained a preliminary in-
junction against the President blocking their threatened removal on Janu-
ary 7, 1993. Recognizing the ongoing dispute between Justice and the 
Postal Service before the D.C. Circuit, district Judge John Oberdorfer rea-
soned that "a district court in this Circuit has the responsibility and the 
authority to protect the jurisdiction of our Court of Appeals"38 and that 
the threatened Service removal from the suit could be "irrevocably disrup-
tive" to postal operations. Even though Supreme Court rulings disfavor 
injunctive relief against the President,39 the court held that preservation 
of D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over the litigation authority dispute "is neces-
sary for the performance of the Judiciary's constitutional function" and 
warrants the exercise of judicial authority over the President. 40 
The White House, subscribing to the adage that desperate times call 
for desperate measures, responded with a vengeance to its district court 
defeat and immediately appealed the Oberdorfer order. Furthermore, on 
January 7, the same day that Judge Oberdorfer issued his injunction, the 
Justice Department filed on behalf of the Postal Service separate motions to 
withdraw the Postal Service from both the private mailer and Commission 
lawsuits.41 Although clearly allied with Justice in the private mailer dis-
pute, the Commission signed onto Justice's motion to withdraw even the 
3 7. It is also a bit misleading to characterize the Board vote as a six to five decision not to 
comply. Seven of the eleven Board members voted to table a motion to comply with the White 
House directive and, instead, to write a letter to the President. See Bill McAllister, Divided Postal 
Board Seeks to Forestall Firings, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1993, at A15; Michael York, Bush Blocked 
From Firing Postal Board, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1993, at Al. The very next day, however, Gover· 
nor Tirco del Junco switched sides and refused to join forces with the six noncomplying Board 
members. 
38. Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144, 146 (D.D.C. 1993). 
39. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). Oberdorfer found Franklin 
distinguishable because the injury in Mackie could only be redressed by a presidential injunction. 
Mackie, 809 F. Supp. at 146. 
40. Mackie, 809 F. Supp. at 146. Oberdorfer did not conclude that the Postal Service pos· 
sessed litigation authority, only that the D.C. Circuit was constitutionally entitled to resolve the 
litigation authority issue. ld. 
41. See Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Separate Representation and Brief as Re· 
spondent, Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 
91·1073); Joint Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Petition for Review, Mail Order Ass'n v. 
United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-1073). 
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Service-Commission suit. The Commission, apparently, was willing to 
forego whatever litigating authority it might possess to undermine Postal 
Service independence. 
4. A Last Ditch Effort: The Recess Appointment 
The White House also attacked Service independence through the 
President's January 8 recess appointment of his longtime friend Thomas 
Ludlow Ashley to the Service's Board of Governors.42 Ashley was ap-
pointed to replace Crocker Nevin, whose official term had expired and who 
was serving in a "holdover" capacity. By substituting Nevin with a gover-
nor who supported the Bush directive, the Ashley appointment was de-
signed to turn the administration's six to five defeat into a six to five victo-
ry. Named on the first day of a twelve day recess (a recess, incidentally, in 
which Senate committees were holding confirmation hearings of President-
elect Bill Clinton's nominees), Ashley's appointment was-to put it mild-
ly-controversial. lt raised profound constitutional and somewhat mundane 
statutory questionsY 
Before the dust could settle, the D.C. Circuit on January 13 scheduled 
oral arguments on the Postal Service's self-representation motion. The 
Court heard those arguments on January 14, and decided on January 15 
that the Postal Service had a right to air its views on ratemaking matters. 
Working from the premise that Congress intended courts to resolve disputes 
between the Postal Service and Commission, the D.C. Circuit accepted the 
common sense argument that the Postal Service's ability to vigorously 
present its own views in judicial proceedings presupposes independent lit-
igating authority. 44 Not only did the D.C. Circuit validate the Postal 
Service's reading of statutory language, it also chided the Department for its 
efforts to keep Service-Commission disputes out of court. "Through this 
refusal," wrote the court, "the Department effectively substitutes its own 
review for judicial review of disputes between the [Commission] and the 
Postal Service. . . . [W]here Congress has specifically authorized judicial 
42. See Michael York & Stephen Barr, Bush Appoints Supporter in Postal Board Dispute, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at AI. 
43. The Ashley appointment, occurring during the first day of a twelve day recess, squarely 
raised the question of whether the recess appointment power is unqualified or whether the 
Constitution limits this power to recesses of a significant period of time. The statutory issue 
raised by the Ashley appointment was whether there was a vacancy on the Service's Board of 
Governors. See infra note 47. 
44. Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 516-17 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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review of such disputes, ... we [cannot] permit Uustice] unilaterally to re-
peal that statutory authority. "45 
Incredibly, the D.C. Circuit decision did not end the Postal Service-
Justice Department dispute. The Ashley recess appointment still lingered 
in the background, and the Clinton Justice Department picked up exactly 
where the Bush Justice Department left off. While ostensibly committed to 
independent agency authority, the Clinton Justice Department advanced an 
expansive view of the President's recess appointment power and challenged 
the Service's filing of an amicus curiae brief without Department con-
sent.46 Like other Justice initiatives in its war with the Postal Service, 
these arguments were rejected. On July 23, Judge Oberdorfer wrote the 
final chapter of this saga, invalidating the Ashley appointment on statutory 
groundsY 
D. Analysis of the Outcome 
The failure of White House efforts to overtake the Postal Service is a 
story of structure and politics.48 The Bush Administration's first mistake 
was to target the wrong adversaries within the Postal Service. The Post-
master General and General Counsel are fierce advocates of Postal Service 
independence. The Board of Governors, in contrast, is more likely to be 
sensitive to White House concerns. Serving in a part-time capacity, these 
individuals do not develop the same types of relationships with professional 
staffs or the same institutional commitments as full-time independent agen-
cy heads. Moreover, all of the Governors had either been appointed by 
Presidents Bush or Reagan. In fact, a majority of five of the nine presi-
dentially-appointed Governors voted to comply with the directive. It was 
45. Id. at 527. 
46. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 12-13 n.11, Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 
(D.D.C. 1993) (No. 93..0032). 
47. Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993). Oberdorfer reasoned that the case 
did not call into question the President's recess power appointment because there was no vacancy 
among the Board of Governors. Pointing to a statutory specification that holdover governors 
remain in office until a "successor qualified," Oberdorfer concluded that Ashley could only suc-
ceed Nevin if he had been "nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate." Id. at 
57-58. Ashley, along with the Justice Department, appealed this decision. On March 9, 1994, 
after the Clinton administration nominated and the Senate confirmed Einar Dyhrkopp to fill 
Nevin's seat, the D.C. Circuit mooted the Ashley case. Mackie v. Clinton, No. 93-5287 (D.C. 
Cir. Mar. 9, 1994) (per curiam order). 
48. Some of these conclusions can be found in my contribution to a Cardozo Law Review 
symposium on the unitary executive. Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What 
Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 213 (1993). 
HeinOnline -- 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1049 1993-1994
Tempest in an Envelope 1049 
only the additional votes of the Postmaster General and his deputy (who 
vote as Board members on non-ratemaking issues) that created the six-to· 
five vote against compliance. Had President Bush appointed Ashley in a 
timely fashion, it seems likely that he would have garnered an additional 
vote in favor of following the directive, thereby achieving a majority of 
votes for compliance. 
The Bush Administration's failure in the Postal Service dispute is 
largely attributable to poor political judgment. The President's failure to 
fill a possible Board vacancy certainly limited his influence over the Gover-
nors. More strikingly, the timing of the President's directive was horren· 
dous. Rather than object to independent Postal Service advocacy soon af. 
ter the Service filed its claim, the Administration waited close to twenty 
months before launching its offensive. The D.C. Circuit expressed disap· 
proval of this footdragging in its December 8 order.49 lt is also unlikely 
that these delay tactics enamored the Service's Board of Governors. 
The D.C. Circuit was unsympathetic for other reasons as well. Con· 
gress, for better or worse, made the courts of appeals postal ratemaking czars 
when it statutorily specified that Service-Commission disputes be resolved 
in those courts. The D.C. Circuit, never one to shy away from an active 
participatory role in government decisionmaking,50 undoubtedly saw Jus-
tice's powergrab as an attack on itself as well as the Postal Service. Indeed, 
Judge Oberdorfer rooted his injunction in protecting the D.C. Circuit's 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit's self-representation decision, 
for example, takes aim at the Justice Department for seeking to "substitute[] 
its own review for judicial review."51 
lt is also significant that the Bush directive came a month after his 
electoral defeat. The brevity of his remaining time in office certainly cur-
tailed the President's ability to work his political will. For example, if the 
President had more time, he could have engaged the Governors in some 
type of dialogue before threatening removal. By threatening removal and 
naming a recess appointee in the final days of the Administration, the 
White House action came under fire from the press and the Congress. 52 
Whether this political firestorm enhanced Postal Service resistance or made 
49. Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., No. 91-1073 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 1992) 
(Order). 
50. See John F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test: Constructing a Positive 
Theory of Judicial Obedience and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745, 748-49 (1992). 
51. Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509,527 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
52. See Lewis, supra note 1, at A17; Tempest in an Envelope, supra note 1, at A20; Letter 
from George Mitchell et al. to President George Bush Oan. 12, 1993). 
HeinOnline -- 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1050 1993-1994
1050 41 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1035 (1994) 
the D.C. Circuit skeptical of Justice Department arguments is hard to 
know. What is clear is that the political fallout did not help the President. 
President Bush's Postal Service gambit was clearly a political failure. 
When all was said and done, the tension between the Postal Service and 
Justice Department was replaced by a slam dunk judicial victory for the 
Service. Moreover, claims of unitary presidential authority over independ-
ent agency heads suffered a stinging rebuke in both the courts and the 
popular media. 
Nevertheless, the Postal Service dispute is about more than the failure 
of "unitary executive" claims, the steadfastness of independent agency offi-
cials, and the D.C. Circuit's view of its jurisdiction as a sacred cow. lt is 
also about Congress. Throughout this dispute, Congress hardly broke a 
sweat even though the structure of postal ratemaking is a creature of Con-
gress. What Congress did and did not do, as the next Part reveals, should 
not be underestimated. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND POSTAL RA TEMAKING 
Part I describes a system of postal ratemaking that would amaze Rube 
Goldberg. Congress and the courts, however, have applauded this Service-
Commission-Courts troika. In approving Postal Service self-representation, 
. the D.C. Circuit argued that "this was not a piecemeal or haphazard ef-
fort," but a "unique," "deliberately chosen," "complex and delicate," "care-
fully crafted . . . ratemaking structure" "that created a deliberate tension 
between the Postal Service and the Rate Commission."53 The 1970 Con-
gress was equally laudatory in touting its deliberateness. The House's Post 
Office Committee reported "[fourteen months] of almost total immersion in 
[the] controversial and complex subject [of postal reorganization]";54 the' 
Senate Committee similarly described its efforts as "one of the longest and 
most intensive studies in the committee's history." 55 
There is little doubt that Congress invested significant energy and 
resources in establishing the Postal Service and Rate Commission in 1970, 
thereby removing postal operations from executive control and postal rate-
making from legislative control. Even so, the division of responsibility 
between Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission over ratemaking was 
crafted in the eleventh hour, and the question of independent litigating 
authority was never considered by the Congress. 
53. Mail Order Ass'n, 986 F.2d at 513,519-21. 
54. H.R. REP. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970). 
55. S. REP. No. 912, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). 
HeinOnline -- 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1051 1993-1994
Tempest in an Envelope 1051 
Worse yet, when presented with opportunities in 1975 and 1992 to 
illuminate its views on self-representation, Congress was either mute or 
indifferent. As can be seen in its handling of self-representation issues in 
other contexts, independent litigating authority is an issue that does not 
enter Congress' radar screen. This Part, on calling attention to Congress' 
blemishes, will suggest that Congress was a silent partner in the Bush Ad-
ministration's failed takeover of postal ratemaking. 
A. Congress and Postal Ratemaking 
The story begins in 1966. Following a debilitating Christmas-time 
mail strike in Chicago, President Lyndon Johnson appointed a commission 
headed by AT&T chair Frederick Kappel to assess postal operations.56 ln 
May 1968, the Kappel Commission issued a two-volume report recommend-
ing that the Postal Service become an independent government agency 
with a rate commission within that agency. 57 The Commission would 
function like an administrative law judge, whose findings could be ac-
cepted, rejected, or modified by a simple majority of the Service's Gover-
nors. Congress, moreover, would retain significant control over ratemaking 
through a legislative veto mechanism that would enable either the House 
or Senate to vote down ratemaking proposals. Judicial authority, finally, 
would be severely constrained. There would be no Administrative Proce-
dures Act review for substantiality of evidence; courts would only consider 
constitutional and procedural defects. 58 
One year later, in May 1969, President Richard Nixon and his Post-
master General Winton Blount endorsed the Kappel Report. 59 Congress 
moved slowly on the Nixon proposal until a March 1970 mail strike in 
New York jump-started comprehensive postal reform. From April to June 
1970, Congress held hearings and worked out the details for "[c]onverting 
the Post Office Department into an independent establishment in the 
56. Exec. Order No. 11,341, 3 C.F.R. 632 (1966-70). For histories of congressional action, 
see 116 CoNG. REC. 21,708 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McGee); Robert A. Saltzstein & Ronald E. 
Resh, Postal Reform: Some Legal and Practical Considerations, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 766, 
766-69 (1971). 
57. HOUSE CoMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 94TH CoNG., 2D SESS., TO-
WARDS POSTAL EXCELLENCE: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON POSTAL OR-
GANIZATION (Comm. Print 1976). 
58. Id. at 153. 
59. See Saltzstein & Resh, supra note 56, at 767-68. 
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Executive Branch of the Government, freed from direct political pres-
sures. "60 
The structure of postal ratemaking figured prominently in these delib-
erations. The Nixon Administration and House sponsors favored the 
Kappel Commission model which supported the legislative veto as a con-
gressional check on Postal Service ratemaking. The House Report, for 
example, stated that Congress "must not abandon its general responsibility 
for seeing to it that the American public is not required to pay clearly un-
reasonable postage rates. "61 The Senate, in contrast, favored judicial re-
view as the principal check on postal ratemaking. Speaking of the need to 
"take . . . the Congress of the United States out of the lobbying business 
itself, "62 the Senate endorsed substantial-evidence review by the D.C. 
Circuit. The Senate also supported the lodging of principal ratemaking 
authority in an independent Postal Rate Commission. Disapproving of the 
creation of a Postal Service Board of Governors to oversee an internal 
commission, the initial Senate version also envisioned a presidentially 
appointed Postmaster General empowered to approve or send back for re-
consideration Commission ratemaking proposals. 63 
Despite differences, the Nixon Administration, House, and Senate 
proposals all envisioned a single body principally responsible for postal rate-
making. Under the Nixon and House plans, Rate Commission recommen-
dations would figure prominently in deliberations, and the Service's Board 
of Governors would have plenary authority over ratemaking. The Senate 
bill empowered both the Commission and Postmaster General, but placed 
principal ratemaking responsibilities with the Commission. The Commis-
sion would ultimately be responsible for proposing and justifying postal 
rates. 
How then did Congress ultimately settle on a scheme of spreading 
ratemaking authority among the Service, Commission, and courts of ap-
peals? The answer, which makes little sense, is that Congress wanted to 
strike back at Postmaster General Blount for his plans to raise first class 
postage. The Senate Report, for example, speaks of the "temptation ... 
[of] charging the lion's share of all operational costs to first class" and the 
"necessity for ... [protecting] the only class of mail which the general pub-
lic uses [as] one of the reasons why the Postal Rate Commission should be 
60. Message from the President of the United States Relative tQ Postal Reform, PUB. PA· 
PERS, 117 (April 16, 1970). 
61. H.R. REP. No. 1104, supra note 54, at 5. 
62 . 116 CoNG. REC. 22,051 (1970) (statement of Sen. McGee). 
63 . S. 3613 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 77 (1970). 
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independent of operating management. "64 At the same time, Congress 
also embraced the House-proposed Postal Service Board of Governors. In 
melding two independent agencies into a single ratemaking apparatus, 
Congress granted significant authority to both agencies and left it to the 
courts to arbitrate Service-Commission disputes.65 Introduced in the Sen-
ate on May 14, 1970, and reported out of committee on june 3, this curious 
creation was quickly embraced by House-Senate conferees. 66 
Whether the Postal Service and/or the Rate Commission had inde-
pendent litigating authority in ratemaking was never seriously considered 
by the House, the Senate, or the bill conferees. The principal House bill 
specified that "with the prior consent of the Attorney General, the Postal 
Service may employ attorneys by contract or otherwise to conduct litiga-
tion."67 The bill, however, did not contemplate an independent Rate 
Commission or a significant judicial role. The original Senate bill, which 
substituted judicial review of independent Commission ratemaking for the 
legislative veto, also failed to mention litigation authority. The enacted 
bill does presuppose adversarial litigation between an independent Postal 
Service and an independent Rate Commission, but makes limited, ambig-
uous, and ultimately unhelpful reference to possible sources of independent 
litigation authority. 
The Act contains no provisions that explicitly exempt Attorney Gen-
eral control or that clearly grant the Service independent litigating author-
ity. The only Act provision that unequivocally addresses representation is 
horribly ambiguous. The provision requires Attorney General consent to 
litigation conducted by the Postal Service, directs the Justice Department 
to "furnish the Postal Service such legal representation as it may require," 
and refers to statutory language requiring services rendered to the Postal 
Service to be "deem[ed] appropriate" by the Service.68 Because this provi-
sion was lifted from the principal House bill, legislation that envisioned a 
de minimis judicial role in ratemaking disputes, it is uninstructive in ascer-
taining Service litigation authority in ratemaking matters. 
Act ratemaking provisions are equally ambiguous. The bone of conten-
tion here is a cryptic reference to a series of statutory provisions governing 
process, venue, jurisdiction and the like, including chapter 158 of title 28, 
64. S. REP. No. 912, supra note 55, at 13; see also A. Lee Fritschler, The Postal Service: In 
the Black-and Hiding It, WASH. POST, June 21, 1983, at A19. 
65. 39 u.s.c. §§ 3625, 3628 (1988). 
66. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1364, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
67. H.R. 11,750, 91stCong., 2d Sess. § 208(d) (1970). 
68. 39 u.s.c. §§ 409(d), 411 (1988). 
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better known as the Hobbs Act. Among the Hobbs Act's hundred provi-
sions is the specification that an agency may defend its final orders in its 
own name when it is dissatisfied with Justice Department representation. 69 
What did Congress intend by this Hobbs Act reference? Did it only 
intend to apply the jurisdiction and venue-related provisions to ratemaking 
procedures? Or did Congress also intend to incorporate the self-representa-
tion provisions of the Hobbs Act? The answer, not surprisingly, is a bit 
strange. Had Congress given the matter any thought it almost certainly 
would have supported self-representation. Congress, however, did not con-
sider the actual operation of its ratemaking scheme and it probably included 
its generic Hobbs Act reference as part of a process-venue-jurisdiction pro-
vtston. The legislative history is devoid of any reference to litigation au-
thority issues. Congress imagined that Service-Commission disputes would 
be resolved in adversarial litigation before the federal appellate courts, but 
apparently never contemplated limiting traditional Department of Justice 
control over government litigation. When Congress exempts government 
entities from Justice Department control, it typically inserts explicit grants 
of independent litigation authority.70 With reference to the Hobbs Act 
grants of litigation authority, moreover, postal ratemaking presents a unique 
situation. Rather than one government agency defending its final order, 
ratemaking disputes involve two independent entities, with the Postal 
Service challenging the Rate Commission order and the Commission de-
fending its workproduct. No other statutory reference to the Hobbs Act 
authorizes either the initiation of litigation or the granting of litigation 
authority exceptions to two government entities. It seems unlikely that 
Congress would sub silentio deviate so much from past practice. 
lt is more likely that Congress simply ignored the litigation authority 
issue. The apparent source of the Hobbs Act reference supports this con-
clusion. The principal House bill incorporated "[t]he provisions of title 28 
relating to service of process, venue, [etc.] ... and the rules of procedure 
adopted under title 28. "71 The final bill's specification that "[t]he Court 
shall review the [Commission] decision in accordance with ... chapter 158 
and section 2172 of title 28"72 simply seems a more precise articulation of 
principal House bill language. 
69. 28 u.s.c. § 2348 (1988). 
70. Note how other agencies covered by Hobbs are mentioned by name. See 28 U.S.C. § 
2341(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
71. H.R. 17,070, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 113(b) (1970). 
72. 39 u.s.c. § 3628 (1988). 
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Congress' apparent indifference to the litigation authority is also re-
vealed by its refusal to clarify the self-representation issue when the oppor-
tunity arose in 1975. From 1970 to 1974, the relationship between the 
Justice Department and Postal Service was rocky. The Postal Service had 
asked to represent itself in five cases, but the Attorney General denied 
permission in each case. 73 When Congress debated the Postal Reorganiza-
tion Act in 1975, the Service requested that it be permitted "to choose 
whether to conduct its own litigation. "74 The Service maintained that an 
amendment was necessary to "clarify the point that the relationship in-
tended between the Department of Justice and Postal Service is that of 
attorney-client." The Service, however, also complained of being "handi-
capped by having to rely on the Justice Department in specialized areas 
such as postal rates. "75 The Rate Commission supported the amendment 
which would have accorded it independent litigating authority, but con-
ceded that "Justice controls court litigation ... and Justice determines the 
representation which will be made to the court. "76 The Justice Depart-
ment opposed an amendment and stressed the propriety "of an attorney 
representing the interests of the government as a whole" and the propriety 
of continued Attorney General control over ratemaking. 77 Congress did 
not settle this dispute and the litigation authority issue died in committee 
without comment.78 
Congress' blase attitude towards litigation authority continues. During 
the Postal Service's dispute with the Bush administration, Congress was 
silent about Postal Service self-representation as well as the President's 
threat to fire disobedient Governors. The only matter to get a rise out of 
Congress was President Bush's recess appointment. Viewing the appoint-
ment as a threat to their confirmation authority, ranking Senate Democrats 
sent a letter of protest to the White House and sought to file an amicus 
73. H.R. REP. No. 243, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975). 
74. Postal Reorganization Act Amendments of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 2445 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Postal Senlice of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 203 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Hearings] (statement by Louis A. Cox, General Counsel, U.S. 
Postal Service). 
75. Letter from Lewis A. Cox, General Counsel, U.S. Postal Serv., to David N. Henderson, 
Chairman, House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service (Feb. 20, 197 5) reprinted in H.R. REP. 
No. 243, supra note 73, at 9-10, 10; see also H.R. REP. No. 243, supra note 73, at 4. 
76. I 975 Hearings, supra note 74, at 163 (statement by Clyde S. DuPont, Acting Chairman, 
Postal Rate Commission). 
77. Letter from A. Mitchell McConnell, Jr., Acting Assistant Attorney General, to David 
N. Henderson, Chairman, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service (Mar. 12, 1975), 
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 243, supra note 73, at 15-16. 
78. The House Subcommittee, however, did report out the litigation authority provision. 
See H.R. REP. No. 243, supra note 73, at 3. 
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brief in opposition to the President. 79 Even that congressional interest 
quickly dissipated. When Postmaster General Marvin Runyon testified 
before a Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee in March, the litiga-
tion authority dispute was not mentioned. Congress, instead, was much 
more interested in why Runyon tossed Federal Express packages into the 
trash, the Postal Service's ability to deliver priority mail in two days, and a 
range of issues connected to the restructuring of postal operations. 80 With 
the D.C. Circuit filling in the gaps left by Congress, it is unlikely that the 
litigation authority issue will ever receive serious examination in Congress. 
The question of whether the D.C. Circuit went too far in concluding 
that Congress authorized Postal Service self-representation still remains. 
The legislative record suggests that Congress did not bestow independent 
litigating authority on either the Service or Commission. Because Justice 
Department control is presumed in the absence of a specific statutory ex-
ception, there is some reason to think that the D.C. Circuit reached the 
wrong conclusion. 81 
With that said, it would be incorrect to conclude that Congress in-
tended to constrain Service or Commission independence before the D.C. 
Circuit. The 1970 Congress emphasized that "[i]nsulation from partisan 
politics" was the principal aim of postal reform and "that all of the short-
comings of the Post Office Department are bound up in the fact that re-
sponsibility for managing the system is shared by a number of executive 
agencies and by several congressional committees. "82 To keep postal rate-
making removed from partisan politics, Congress explicitly left it to the 
D.C. Circuit to resolve ratemaking disputes between the Service and Com-
mission. Consequently, one could sensibly conclude that the Hobbs Act 
self-representation provision extends to the Postal Service simply because it 
79. See Letter from George Mitchell to President George Bush, supra note 52; 139 CONG. 
REC. S8544 (daily ed. July 1, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell and copy of draft Senate amicus 
brief, the submission of which was blocked by Republican opposition). 
80. See Oversight of the U.S. Postal Service: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Federal Services, 
Post Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993). 
81. Dan Kahan, commenting on an earlier draft of this piece, defended the D.C. Circuit by 
suggesting that the right approach would be to resolve any doubts in favor of independent litigat-
ing authority for independent agencies. Since Congress presumably intends independent agencies 
to be free of direct executive control, a presumption in favor of independent litigating authority 
seems quite reasonable. The problem with this presumption-and 1 think it is fatal-is that Con-
gress has statutorily specified that Justice Department control should be presumed unless "other-
wise authorized." 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988). 
82. H.R. REP. No. 1104, supra note 54, at 12, 5. 
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makes no sense for Service-Commission dispute resolution authority to be 
lodged in the Justice Department. 
Congress, of course, need not make sense when it acts. The Postal 
Reorganization Act evidences a dear failure to think through the conse-
quences of sharing postal ratemaking authority among two competing agen-
cies. Congress' failure here is not unusual. Litigation authority issues are 
often given short shrift by the Congress despite the prominent role they 
play in agency policymakingY 
B. Congress and Independent Agency Self-Representation 
Court action often plays a decisive role in regulatory agency decision-
making. ln many instances, judicial review is the principal constraint on 
regulatory rulemaking. A joint letter to President Carter, signed by ranking 
majority and minority leadership of several Senate committees, illustrates 
this point. Cautioning the President against excessive White House man-
agement of agency rulemaking, these Senate leaders argued that "in exercis· 
ing the quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative authority which Congress has 
delegated to the agencies, agency actions shall not be subject to review or 
modification by either Congress or the executive; only the courts may re-
view final agency actions. "84 
The predominant role of judicial review and control over independent 
agency litigation authority go hand in hand. Without litigation authority, 
an agency's decision could be modified or rejected by the Justice Depart-
ment. For example, Justice's proposal that Postal Service-Rate Commission 
disputes be channelled through the Office of Legal Counsel would have 
significantly reduced the ability of both the Postal Service and Rate Com-
mission to advance their competing approaches to postal ratemaking policy. 
The Postal Service episode may be an extreme case but it leaves no doubt 
that agency policymaking ofttimes is a function of litigation authority. 
In spite of the importance of the litigation authority issue, Congress 
has not carefully thought through agency self-representation. Postal rate-
making is an extreme example of legislative incoherence, but it is not the 
only example. Years after Congress created the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), Congress finally took notice of inadequacies in Justice Department 
83. This topic is addressed in some detail in Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: 
Solicitor General Control of Independent Agency Litigation, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
84. Letter from Bipartisan Senate Leadership to President Jimmy Carter (Dec. 16, 1977), 
reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and In11estigations 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170, 172 (1981). 
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representation and granted the Commission independent litigation author-
ity.85 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provides a more 
striking example of the haphazard nature of Congressional grants of litiga-
tion authority.86 The Department of Justice has plenary responsibility 
over actions launched in district court. The Commission handles appeals 
of radio and television licensing decisions before courts of appeal and the 
Solicitor General deals with those matters before the Supreme Court. 
Appeals of other FCC decisions are handled by the Commission before the 
courts of appeal and in some instances to the Supreme Court through the 
filing of a certiorari petition. 
Congressional treatment of the FCC, FTC, and Postal Service exem-
plifies the randomness of legislative grants of independent litigating author-
ity. To leave no doubt that congressional exceptions to Department of 
Justice control lack a coherent pattern, consider the following: 87 some 
entities have independent litigating authority on all matters before all 
courts (the Federal Election Commission, the Senate's Office of Legal 
Counsel, special prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in Government 
Act, and others); some entities have independent litigating authority on 
some matters before all courts (the Department of Agriculture, the FTC, 
and others); some entities have independent litigating authority on some 
matters before some courts (the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Department of Health and Human Services}; some entities have inde-
pendent litigating authority on all matters before some courts (the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com· 
mission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Internal Revenue 
Service, and others}; and some entities have independent litigating author-
ity on some matters before all courts and on other matters before some 
courts (the FCC, the Federal Maritime Commission, and others). 
To expect Congress to have a coherent vision of the structure and 
purposes of independent agencies is to expect the impossible. The Senate 
Committee on Governmental Operations admitted as much when it casual-
ly noted that "(a] decision on structure is after all a political issue, very 
much influenced by the prevailing political situation. And that situation 
85. Trans-Alaskan Pipe Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576, 591, 
592 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (1973)); Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act 
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637,88 Stat. 2183,2199. For a recounting of this episode, see Devins, 
supra note 83. 
86. 47 u.s.c. § 154(f), (i) (1988). 
87. See generally ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 19; Devins, supra note 83; 
Olson, supra note 16. 
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can neither be quantified nor predicted. "88 Congress' cavalier attitude 
toward independent litigating authority is nonetheless disheartening. The 
choice to create an independent agency, in some measure, is a choice to 
empower agency heads to reach policy decisions at odds with the White 
House. Otherwise, there is little reason to limit presidential authority to 
dismiss agency heads only "for cause." lt is senseless to encourage agency 
heads to speak their mind without considering the scope of litigation au-
thority. For those who contend that "random selection" explains Congress' 
choice of an independent agency format over an executive format, this 
unsystematic divvying up of litigation authority seems only par for the 
course. For Postal Service Governors threatened with removal, however, 
Congress' failure to clarify Service litigation authority seems a cruel hoax. 
CONCLUSION: THOUGHTS ON REFORMING POSTAL RATEMAKING 
The controversy between the Bush Administration and the Postal 
Service is revealing at several levels. On the surface, the drama of a presi-
dent directing independent agency heads to follow his lead or risk removal 
calls attention to the wide gulf between our jerry-built administrative state 
and the orderly hierarchical model envisioned by "unitary executive" pro-
ponents. This drama, moreover, questions the political sensibility of a 
White House that targets its jawboning at presidentially-appointed agency 
heads instead of the professionals whose day-to-day responsibilities directly 
correlate to agency independence. 
The Postal Service saga is also a story about the politics of adjudica-
tion. The D.C. Circuit's validation of its authority in postal ratemaking 
and punishment of the Bush Administration for its hardball efforts to keep 
the controversy out of court helps explain the resolution of this dispute. 
Indeed, Judge Oberdorfer's injunction makes clear that the courts did not 
simply view this battle as a fight between the Bush Administration and Pos-
tal Service. The courts considered themselves a player with their own turf 
to lose.89 With that said, it is at least plausible, however, that a more 
contrite Justice Department might have convinced the D.C. Circuit that 
Congress failed to exempt the Service from Attorney General control. 
88. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION 79 
(1977). 
89. For Oberdorfer, the turf at issue was the D.C. Circuit's authority to determine whether 
the Postal Service possessed independent litigation authority. See supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text. 
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The Postal Service dispute extends beyond the front line players-the 
Service, the Bush Administration, and the courts. Congress and the Rate 
Commission also played important roles in this controversy. This dispute is 
very much a by-product of Congress' failure to consider litigation authority 
concerns when it enacted the Postal Reorganization Act in 1970 and a-
mended the Act in 1975. Had Congress devised a workable representation 
scheme at those times, the circumstances prompting this dispute would not 
have arisen. Congress' failure here is not simply the failure to consider 
representation issues in one statutory scheme. Congressional inattentive-
ness here is symptomatic of Congress' more prevalent failure to seriously 
consider litigation authority issues. 
Congress would be ill-advised to consider the D.C. Circuit decision as 
a solution to the ratemaking dispute. Although it is tempting for Congress 
to lean on courts that are willing to fix defective regulatory statutes through 
policy-laden rules of construction, judicial action is a poor substitute for 
meaningful legislative deliberation and careful legislative drafting. Indeed, 
the D.C. Circuit decision is no more than a band-aid on a much larger 
hurt. Remember, the circumstance that prompted Bush Administration 
intervention was Rate Commission dissatisfaction with the Postal Service, 
acting as party-defendant, "defending" Commission rates. The D.C. Cir-
cuit decision exacerbates this problem. By recognizing Postal Service au-
thority to represent itself, the Rate Commission's worst fears have been 
realized. In its ultimate resolution of the private mailer case, the D.C. 
Circuit both approved Postal Service arguments and forbade the Rate Com-
mission from filing an amicus brief. 90 
What then should be done with postal ratemaking? The present sys-
tem is premised on the mistaken belief that the Postal Service and Rate 
Commission will only occasionally lock horns with each other. The 1970 
Senate Committee Report, for example, speaks of the "expect[ation] that 
the Commission will work in harmony with the Board of Governors. "91 
Furthermore, in language quoted by the D.C. Circuit, the Senate Report 
cautions that "[i]f a bureaucratic struggle between the Board and the Com-
missioners develops, then the whole theory of independent ratemaking 
judgments will have failed and the Congress will probably be called upon to 
revise the system. "92 One need not be a consultant to the Postal Service 
90. Mail Order Ass'n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (private mailer dispute); Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv. II, 2 F.3d 408 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (order denying Rate Commission request to file amicus curiae brief). 
91. S. REP. No. 912, supra note 53, at 14. 
92. Id. at 13, quoted in Mail Order Ass'n, 986 F.2d at 527. 
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to recognize that, despite "infrequent disputes, "93 the Service and Com-
mission are not especially fond of each other. The Commission, for exam· 
ple, did much more than side with the Bush Administration in its dispute 
with the Postal Service. lt launched a clandestine attack against the Ser-
vice by writing letters to the Justice Department that were not shared with 
the Service and lobbying Senators to pressure Justice into opposing Service 
self-representation.94 The Service, in kind, opposed the Commission's 
efforts to file an amicus brief in the private mailer dispute.95 These dis-
putes are longstanding. ln a scathing criticism of Service ratemaking in 
1983, former Commission Chair A. Lee Fritschler (apparently oblivious to a 
statutory requirement to the contrary} asked, "What kind of confidence can 
the public have in our largest government corporation if it does not keep its 
books according to generally accepted accounting principles?"96 ln a 1985 
story about Rate Commission efforts to get the Postal Service to turn over a 
"potentially embarrassing" report, the Washington Post noted that the 
relationship between the Service arid Commission "has always been a 
stormy one. "97 
And the "stormy" relationship will likely continue. The Rate Com-
mission owes its existence to Congressional distrust of a too-powerful Post-
master General. As a watchdog agency, the Rate Commission only exer· 
cises its statutory authority when it checks Postal Service desires. ln other 
words, Rate Commission power depends on how confrontational the Com-
mission is in its review of Postal Service proposals. By the same token, 
Postal Service ratemaking authority is directly correlated to its willingness 
to do battle with the Rate Commission. 
When phrased in such adversarial terms, it is apparent why the bar 
code dispute provoked such fierce reactions from both the Service and 
Commission. Postal Service control of private mailer litigation enables the 
93. 986 F.2d at 528. 
94. See su{n'a notes lZ-15 and accompanying text. 
95. See Response of the United States Postal Service in Opposition to Postal Rate Commis· 
sion Motion to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and, in the Alternative, Request for Leave to Reply, 
Mail Order Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv. II, 2 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-1058). 
The Service had earlier invoked the Commission to file an amicus brief on Department of Justice 
efforts to control this litigation. See id. at 2. The Commission rejected this offer and joined 
forces with the Justice Department in its efforts to displace Postal Service self-representation. See 
id. 
96. Fritschler, su{n'a note 64. Fritschler's contention is plainly incorrect. Statutory and 
regulatory requirements demand that the Postal Service follow generally accepted accounting 
procedures. See 39 U.S.C. 2008(e); 39 C.F.R. 3001.54(a). 
97. Keith B. Richburg, Postal Agency Feud Takes Bizarre Twist: 'Nonexistent' Report at Center 
of a Tussle, WASH. POST, July 22, 1985, at All. 
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Service to strike back at the Commission by controlling ratemaking litiga-
tion in cases where it disagrees with the Commission. This type of Postal 
Service control effectively treats Commission recommendations as little 
more than glorified administrative law judge rulings. Unwilling to have its 
ratemaking authority undercut, the Commission fought back. 
Awarding complete litigation authority to both the Commission and 
Postal Service would not ease tensions between these agencies. Each agen-
cy would still have the incentive to maximize its authority by limiting the 
other. A better solution would be to lodge principal ratemaking authority 
and litigation authority to defend its decisionmaking in court through in-
dependent litigation authority-with either the Commission or Postal Ser-
vice. Between the two, the Postal Service seems the better choice. The 
Postal Rate Commission is too far removed from the cost side of postal 
operations to have primary ratemaking authority. Nonetheless, it would be 
a mistake to abolish the Rate Commission. The dangers of a too powerful 
Postmaster General, as the 1970 Congress contended, cannot be ignored. 
Without a quasi-independent Rate Commission, the Service's part-time 
Board of Governors would be ill-prepared to provide a meaningful check on 
a Postmaster General who controls all aspects of postal operations.98 lt is 
therefore sensible that a presidentially nominated and Senate confirmed 
group of ratemaking experts provide high profile review of Postal Service 
proposals. That way the Service's part-time Board of Governors will be 
hesitant to ride rough-shod over Commission recommendations. At the 
same time, the Governors are the principal ratemakers and should he able 
to accept, reject, or modify Commission findings by a simple majority vote. 
With the Postal Service empowered to modify Commission recommenda-
tions, the Commission will take extra pains to work with the Service to 
convince the Governors and Postmaster General of the correctness of its 
findings. 
The above model, amazingly, is almost identical to the one proposed 
in the Kappel Report and the original House bill.99 The only significant 
difference is the substitution of judicial review for the now unconstitutional 
legislative veto. Congress, admittedly, is unlikely to retrace its steps. After 
all, the Bush Administration dispute, rather than serving as a rather loud 
wake-up call, was hardly noticed by Congress. This is unfortunate. The 
current postal ratemaking scheme is badly in need of repair. 
98. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
